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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD 0. HARTINSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 16345

THE INDUSTRIAL COI1MISSION OF
UTAH, IV-M INSURANCE AGENCY,
INC., and THE STATE INSURANCE
FUND,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Donald 0. Martinson filed a claim for compensation
with the Industrial Commission of Utah alleging that he was
entitled to workman's compensation benefits as the result
of injuries received in an accident occurring on November 21,
1976.

Liability for benefits \vas denied by the compensation

insurance carrier on the basis that the injuries were not
received while Mr. Hartinson was in the course and scope
of his employment with W-M Insurance Agency, Inc.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL Co:t-1MISSION·
Following a formal hearing held on June 9, 1978,
Administrative Law Judge Keith E. Sohm entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order denying Mr. Martinson's
claim and dismissing his application.

Hr. Martinson made a
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timely Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission as
a whole, and on February 8, 1979, the Commission entered an
Order affirming the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants respectfully request that the Order
of the Industrial Commission be affirmed and the claim of
the plaintiff dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants submit the following statement of facts
as additions and exceptions to those recited by plaintiff.
Approximately a week prior to the grand opening of
the Kimball Art Center in Park City, Utah, Hr. Martinson
received an invitation from Nr. Robert Hilliams to attend
that openinz o.;-.ci s:=ay as his guest with himself and his
1vife at cr.eu condominium in Park City.

(R. 23-24, 41-42, 51)

Mr. and Mrs. Williams were friends of Nr. Nartinson and had
entertained him previously at their Park City condominium.
(R. 23, 41-42)

Mr. Williams was also an unsalaried member

of the Board of Directors of the Kimball Art Center. (42)

On the day of the grand opening, Saturday, November
20, 1976, l1r. Martinson arrived in Park City at approximately
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon (R. 21A) and met Mr. Williams
at the Center.

Due to the opening the manager of the Center

was busy and unable to supply Hr. Martinson with all of the
information he desired that day (R. 40-41) concerning the
inventory on hand for the opening exhibi·cion, in which Hr.
Martinson was interested to verify that all the inventory
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was adequately insured.
Mr. Martinson spent Saturday evening dining and
socializing with Mr. and Mrs. Williams and stayed at their
condominium that night.

He arose late the next mo"rning and

spent the afternoon discussing the Art Center account and
other matters of mutual interest with Hr. Williams.

l1r.

Martinson was drinking during these discussions and prior
to his departure back to Salt Lake at approximately 5:30 o'clock
that evening.

Shortly before leaving he telephoned Mr.

Donald R. Hurst in Salt Lake to report to him that he was
increasing the coverage on the Art Center account.
lfui le driving back to Salt Lake City, Mr. Martins on
was involved in an automobile accident.

At the time of his

hospitalization, over two hours after the accident,

~rr.

Martinson was found to have a blood alcohol level of .18
per cent.

(R. 177-78)
The Administrative Law Judge made the following

Findings of Fact:
1.

Mr. Martinson was not directed to attend the

Park City openin8 by his employer; (R. 200)
2.

Mr. Martinson had no ability to appraise art

objects and the changes in coverage 1vhich were made on the
Art Center's policy were made solely on the basis of reports
made by the Art Center and could have been made from his
office; (R. 200)
3.

The trip made by Mr. Hartinson, when viewed

in light of the testimony as a whole, was primarily social
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in nature.

- :)-

It should further be noted that Donald Hurst
testified that the call he received from Mr. Martinson \vas
regarded only as courtesy because Mr. Hartinson had
authority to place the business under binder without making
any request or giving any notice to Hurst.

(R. 63)

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY
POINT I - THERE IS AJITLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
THE INDUSTRIAL COMHISSION' S ORDER DENYING BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF.
In reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission,
this Court must take notice of the long established principles
regarding the proper scope of such review.

By statute, this

Court is vested with jurisdiction to review Commission action
and to set aside such action, "but only upon the following
grounds:

n:.

':"hat the commission acted without or in excess

of its powers; (2)
the award."

That the findings of fact do not support

Utah Code Ann.

§

35-1-84 (1953).

With regard

to factual issues raised before the Commission, Utah Code
Ann.

§

35-1-85 (1953) provides that:
The findings and conclusions of the commission
on questions of fact shall be conclusive and
final and shall not be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts
and the findings and conclusions of the commission.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the findings

of fact made by the Commission are not subject to review
and action based on those findings cannot be disturbed on revie•.;
unless they were made in disregard of substantial and
uncontradicted evidence to the contrary and are totally
without reasonable basis in the record.

See Batchelor v.

Industrial
86 Utah
261,
42by P.2d
(1953);
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of Finance v. Industrial Comm'n. 121 Utah 83, 239 P.2d

185 (1952); Vause v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407
P.2d 1006 (1965); Evans v. Industrial Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d
324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972).

The Court has also acknowledged

that in cases where the evidence is susceptible to different
conclusions, the Court will not weigh the evidence and draw
its own conclusions but will abide by those of the Commission
even if the Court might not have arrived at the same result.
Board of Education v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah 504, 132
P.2d 381 (1942); Peterson v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Utah
175, 129 P.2d 563 (1942).
In Milkovich v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 498, 64
P.2d 1290 (1937), the Court reiterated what must be reflected
in the Commission record before it could set aside findings
of fact entered by the Commission.

It was noted that to

reverse the findings on strength strenght of contrary testimony
before the Commission, it must appear at least that:
(a) the evidence is uncontradicted, and (b) there
is nothing in the record which is intrinsically
discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony and
(c) that the uncontradicted evidence is not wholly
that of interested witnesses or, if the uncontradicted
evidence is wholly or partly from others than
interested witnesses, that the record shows no
bias or prejudice on the part of such other witnesses,
and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such as to
carry a mearsure of conviction to the reasonable
mind and sustain the burden of proof, and (e)
precludes any other explanation or hypothesis as
being more or equally as reasonable, and (f) there
is nothing in the record which would indicate that
the presence of the witnesses gave the commission
such an advantage over the court in aid to its
conclusions that the conclusions should for that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reason not be disturbed.
64 P.2d at 1292.

See also, Norris v. Industrial Comm'n, 90

Utah 256, 61 P.2d 413 (1936).
In the case at bar, primarily on the basis of the
applicant's own testimony, the Administrative Law Judge who
heard that evidence and had an opportunity to evaluate the
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, found that Mr.
Martinson was not acting within the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident.

This conclusion

resulted from the findings that Mr. Martinson vlas invited to
Park City by a long-time firend and former employer to stay
at his condominium; that much of what transpired while

~1r.

Martinson was in Park City was social in nature and not
realted to his employment (of which the evidence concerning
alcohol consumption was merely some corroboration); that he
was not directed to Park City by his employer; and that the
limited job related activities performed while on the trip
could have been accomplished without making the journey.
The evidence in the record supporting these
findings is substantial.

Mr. Martinson testified as to his

friendship and previous social dealings with Mr. Williams
(R. 41-42), his social activities on Saturday and Sunday,
including drinking, (R. 53, 55, 68-69) his inability to
appraise art objects and need to rely on records of the Art
Center ( 40-41, 50-51), the fact of his invitation by Mr.
Williams (R. 51), and the fact that his employer had not
Sponsored
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(R. 33)

Based upon this evidence the Administrative Law
Judge, after citing Prof. Larson's treatise on the effect of
dual purpose trips and the tests to be utilized in deterrning
whether such trips are properly considered as within the course
and scope of employment, indicated that he found Mr. I1artinson's
trip not to be within his employment duties and, therefore,
(R. 201-202)

his accident not compensable.

The rule as expressed by Prof. Larson, and as quoted
by the hearing officer, is as follows:
The basic dual-purpose rule, accepted by the
great majority of jurisdictions, may be summarized
as follows: when a trip serves both business
and personal purposes, it is a personal trip if
the trip would have been made in spite of the
failure or absence of the business purpose and
would have been dropped in the event of failure
of the private purpose, though the business
errand remained undone; it is a business trip if
a trip of this kind would have been made in spite
of the failure or absence of the private purpose,
because the service to be performed for the
e~ployer would have caused the journey to be made
by someone even if it had not coincided with the
employee's personal journey.
IA. Larson, Workman's Compensation g 18.12 at

4-228 (1978).
The Administrative Law Judge found that "(t)aking
the testimony as a whole it is obvious that to quite an
extent the intent of the trip was social."

(R. 201)

In this

proceeding, the plaintiff is not atacking the adoption of
the rule as announced by Prof. Larson, but is arguing that there
should have been no finding that Hr. Martinson's trip had
a primarily social purpose.

This question of fact was

resolved by the Commission against the plaintiff and, as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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demonstrated in the above cited authority, is not open to
revie>v in these proceedings.

In fact, a strong argument couli

be made that an award of compensation would have to be set
aside on review.
In the case of Board Education v. Industrial Comm'n,
102 Utah 504, 132 P.2d 381 (1942), this Court annulled an
award made by the Industrial Commission where the evidence
regarding course and scope of employment was of a similar
quality >vith that presented here.

In that case, an employee

of the Logan City Board of Education had made application
for benefits as a result of an automobile accident he suffered
while returning to Logan from Brigham City.

The testimony

showed that he had gone to Brigham City to deliver a lecture
on recreation and participate in a basketball game.

The

employee testi:ied that as the recreational director for the
Board of Education he conducted these types of activities
frequently, and when he had asked his supervisor about how
often and when he should do so he was instructed to use his
o>m judgment .

On this set of facts the Court set aside his
award, holding that absent more direct proof that his duties
required his attendance in Brigham City there was no competent
evidence upon which to base an award.

This result was

reached despite the Court's acknowledgment that the findings
of the Commission should be presumed correct and not
reviewed unless they were clearly without reasonable basis.
In the present case, where there is no direc'c evidence that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Park City affair, other than the plaintiff's own assumption
that he should, the same result might be mandated even if
the Commission had made findings favoring the plaintiff's
application.
While plaintiff has drawn particular attention
to those portions of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion
which concern the effect of Mr.

~illrtinson's

intoxication at

the time of the accident, it should be noted that the first
reason given for

t~e

denial of benefits, and one which is a

sufficient legal basis, was that the whole trip was outside
of the course and scope of employment regardless of Mr.
Hartinson's state of intoxication at the time he sustained
his injuries.

The fact of his drinking while in Park City

is merely some evidence of the trip's social, as opposed to
business, motivation.

This is especially revealing in light

of Mr. Martinson's own recognition that they had diminished
abilities as an employee when drinking and that it had been
previously pointed out to him that it would be best if he
refrained from drinking while working.

(R. 36,56).

The record as a whole is certainly susceptible to
the interpretation that Mr. Martinson was invited by a long
standing acquaintance and friend to meet with him on one of his
infrequent visits from out of state; that the occasion of
the opening of the Art Center, while being the focus of the
meeting, was basically a social affair which occupied the
resident manager's time and attention to such a degree that
transaction of any real business was impractical; and that
the
little business done on the trip could have been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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accomplished in another manner and didn't require Hr. Hartinsor
attendance on the weekend in question.

The plaintiff is

arguing that these conclusions are wrong, but is failing to
recognize that if there is evidence to support them that this
Court cannot set them aside.
In considering this matter, it would be wise to
bear in mind the admonition expressed in Evans v. Industrial
Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d 324, 502 P.2d 118 (1972):
This type of case, where an employee is injured
and no doubt needs help, and where society might,
if possible, under existing law, furnish help,
--taxes the emotions of people in the judicial
department. It suggests an urgence to overrule
administrative agencies charged with processing
these claims, so as to provide relief without
statutory sanction, to which we cannot succumb.
conclude here that however sincerely someone
else may differ on evidence that justifies
che Commission's conclusion, we must affirm.

IJe

28 Utah 2d at 326.
Given the substantial evidence supporting the
Commission's findings, defendants would submit that the
factual conflicts resolved by that body are not properly
subject to review and the order based on those findings should
be affirmed.
POINT II - EVEN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN IN THE COURSE
AND SOCPE OF HIS E~~LOYEMNT IJHEN IN PARK CITY, HIS SUBSEQUENT
CONDUCT CONSTITUTED A MATERIAL DEVIATION FROM EMPLOYMENT,
PRECLUDING COl1PENSATION.
Even if it were to be assumed that Mr. Hartinson's
trip was within his course of employment when it began, it is
fundamental that an employee can, by voluntarily participatinz
in activities which unjustifiably increase the hazards
associated with his employment, forfeit the protections of
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workman's

comp~nsation.

Such conduct by the employee consti-

tutes a deviation from his course of employment.

As the New

York Court of Appeals noted in Pasquel v. Caverly, 4 N.Y. 2d
28, 148 N.E.2d R99, 901 (1958):
An accident does not arise 'out of' an employment
when it has been occasioned by some merely personal
indulgence or gratification. Departure from the
course of employment does not always depend entirely
on whether an employee, in making a business trip,
was on the route to or from the place where the
business was to be transacted. It may also consist
in deviation from the procedure which would normally
be followed in accomplishing the business errand,
where the death or disability has been the consequence
of the deviation. Thus if an employee were sent
on a mission which would ordinarily be accomplished
in some simple and safe manner, but nevertheless
undertook to perform it in some extraordinary and
hazardous fashion, there is little doubt that
an accident would not be compensable if it arose
from the bizarre and dangerous manner of performance
which the employee had selected. Thus, for instance,
if an employee were sent on an errand requiring him
to cross a bridge that could have been done in
perfect safety, but instead, the employee chose for
his amusement to cross by walking across a grider of
some uncompleted nearby bridge from which he fell
into the river, recovery in Workman's Compensation
would not be available. Such an accident would
not have arisen 'out of' the employment, even though,
at the time, the employee might have been on the
direct route to or from the place of transaction
of the employer's business.
In the case at issue, Mr. Martinson's excessive
consumption of alcohol was a purely personal activity which
rendered his subsequent return trip to Salt Lake extraordinarily
hazardous and which constituted a material deviation from
his course of employment.

The evidence offered at the time

of hearing demonstrates that Mr. Hartinson's level of blood
alcohol over three hours after the time of his last drink was
in excess of twice the legal presumption of intoxication set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (3) (1953), as noted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In voluntarily incapacitating himself in

:~his

manner,

the applicant's actions increased immeasurably the danger
involved in his trip back to his place of residence, both to
himself and others, and it would be wholly inconsistent with
sound public policy for this Court to find his employer
liable for the all too foreseeable result of such a personal
decision.
Prof. Larson, in his treatise on compensation law,
has noted that "if the incidents of the deviation itself are
operative in producing the accident, this in itself will
\veigh heavily on the side on non-compensability, . . . "

IA.

Larson, Workman's Compensation Law§ 19.61 at 4-263 (1972).
Larson goes on to note that
(i)n the prolific category of deviations involving
the fact that drinking usually combined
with driving, in itself added a notorious hazard
and has undoubtedly been a factor in some denials
of compensation, whether specifically mentioned
or not.
dri~kinG,

IA. Larson, supra, at 4-264.

For a Utah case dealing with a

deviation from employment involving socializing and drinking,
see Morley v. Industrial Commission, 23 Utah 2d 212, !f59 P.2d
212 (1969).

In that case, this Court rejected the applicant's

contention that his actions had been merely an accommodation
to a prospective customer and held that his activities,
though tangetially related to an employment purpose, were
a clear deviation from his duties and not compensable.

See

also, Pricev. ShorewoodMotors, Inc., 2141-Jis. 64, 251N.W.
244 (1933).
The plaintiff has urged that Utah's compensation
scheme contemplates only one effect to be given to an
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employee's consumption of

alco~ol,

namely the 15% reduction

in benefits specified in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-14 (1953).
Defendants would urge that this statutory penalty is only
operative when it has been shown that the employee was acting
within the course and scope of his employment, and that in
making that threshold decision the fact finder is free to
utilize all criteria which have been developed for gauging
"course and scope," including noting types of conduct which
manifest such extreme deviation from employment duties that
the nexus between job activity and injury is too attenuated
to invoke any compensation coverage.
In the circumstances of the present case, defendants
submit that it would not be arbitrary and capricious for the
Commission to rest its denial upon a finding that the plaintiff
had, through purely personal decisions regarding how he would
conduct himself, so drastically increased the hazards of his
travel as to constitute a deviation from employment sufficient
to remove himself from the protections afforded employees,
including those of section 35-1-14.
CONCLUSION
The basic contention of the plaintiff in this
proceeding is that the Commission made erroneous factual
determinations when evaluating the evidence presented to them.
The authority cited herein demonstrates that this Court should
not and will not review such decisions by weighing the evidence
to determine how the Court would have resolved those issues,
but will presume those findings to be correct if there
is any reasonable basis upon which they might rest.

Defendants
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findings and conclusions of the Commission and that they shoutc
therefore be affirmed.
DATED this _ _day of Hay, 1979.
BLACK & MOORE

M. DAVID ECKERSLEY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

On this _ _day of Hay, 1979, I mailed a copy of
the foregoing Brief to Kent Shearer, MOCK, SHEARER & CARLING,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 1000 Continental Bank Bldg., Salt Lake
City, Utah

84101.
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